A Flood of Hate
How Hamas Fueled the Adversarial Information Ecosystem on Social Media
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1. Executive Summary

On October 7, the Hamas terrorist organization massacred scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians in an unprecedented terror attack, injuring thousands, and taking nearly 200 hostages. In response, the Israeli Prime Minister declared war on the Hamas organization in Gaza. Over the next two weeks, mainstream social media and fringe platforms became flooded with disinformation and hate speech promoting Hamas’ terror attacks.

In order to better understand the information ecosystem, we established a methodology to explore the proliferation of several types of harmful content related to the Hamas terror attacks, with an emphasis on both mainstream and fringe social media platforms.

Our main findings are:

- The prevalence of Hamas' propaganda materials online helped fuel an adversarial information ecosystem rife with disinformation and hate speech that dehumanizes Israel and global Jewry at-large.

- Hamas’ Telegram network had an outsized impact on the larger social media discussions in the immediate wake of the terror attacks, despite having limited access to mainstream social media platforms.

- In addition to Hamas, nation state actors like Iran are propagating conspiracy theories about the conflict on fringe social media platforms frequented by both far-right and pro-Hamas communities around the world, contributing to radicalization and calls for violence across the entire political landscape.

- The convergence of far-right and racist ideologies with support for Hamas becomes evident on fringe platforms and presents a notably concerning ideological shift that has occurred in far-right extremist circles in the wake of the October 7 terror attacks in Israel.

The research focuses on three case studies exploring forms of propaganda, disinformation, and radicalization, that thrived following the Oct. 7 attack. The first case study seeks to better understand this networked communications strategy, its messaging content, and the ways in which it successfully pushes narratives onto other social media platforms. The second case study explores an emerging conspiracy theory that the Hamas terror attacks in Israel were part of a “false flag” operation. The key features of the claim bear similarities to conspiracies about 9/11 and the USS Liberty among others. The third case study investigates the ways in which pro-Hamas content has begun proliferating on anonymous messageboards frequented by far-right communities around the world, most notably 4chan’s /pol/ message board.

Together, these three case studies show how the so-called “al-Aqsa Flood” campaign and the myriad of anti-Israel conspiracies that emerged in its wake are having a widespread impact on the platform dynamics of major social media companies. Ultimately, Hamas’ ability to hijack the feedback loop between real-world events and online discourse highlighted the ways in which existing tech policies have struggled to pass the stress test of the current Israel-Gaza conflict.
2. Policy Recommendations by WJC

The internet and social media ecosystem is a web of interconnected entities. Content banned by a platform still finds its way into the social media ecosphere through other platforms through a variety of different avenues, most notably from digitally savvy supporters of violent extremist groups online.

These recommendations aim to create a comprehensive and proactive strategy to address the spread of terrorist and extremist content online during ongoing, developing, events, while respecting human rights, ensuring public safety and information accuracy.

**During Ongoing Violent Terrorist Attacks and their immediate aftermath**

We recommend the following:

1. **Real-time monitoring**
   - Social media platforms and tech companies should establish dedicated monitoring teams to identify and swiftly remove content related to the ongoing attack that is glorifying or inciting to violence.

2. **Emergency Reporting Mechanisms**
   - Create emergency reporting mechanisms for users to quickly flag and report potentially harmful content related to the attack that is separate from the regular stream of reporting mechanisms. Ensure that these reports receive immediate attention.

3. **Content Moderation Collaboration**
   - Enhance collaboration between social media platforms, relevant government agencies, and local law enforcement to share real-time information about the attack and emerging threats.
   - Develop clear protocols for reporting and responding to extremist content during active incidents.

4. **Public Alerts and Updates**
   - Utilize official government channels and social media platforms to provide accurate and timely information to the public about the ongoing attack, emergency services, and safety instructions.
   - Use social media platforms to disseminate official updates and debunk false information or rumors.

5. **Strategic Disruption:**
   - Consider temporarily suspending or slowing down certain features on social media platforms (e.g., live streaming, trending topics) to reduce the spread of extremist content and misinformation during the crisis.

6. **Transparency and Accountability:**
   - Social media platforms should be transparent about the actions taken to combat extremist content during ongoing events, while respecting privacy and security concerns.
   - Conduct post-incident evaluations to assess the effectiveness of responses and identify areas for improvement. These should be collaborative and transparent.
2. Policy Recommendations by WJC (cont’d)

**Ongoing efforts to mitigate the spread of violent extremist content and hate speech**

Must focus on:

**Enhanced Regulation and Cooperation:**

1. Regulators should actively engage with fringe platforms and messaging apps to reduce the dissemination of violent extremist content. This engagement could involve setting clear guidelines and expectations for content moderation during ongoing violent attacks.

2. Encourage increased intelligence sharing between social media companies, ISPs, and government agencies to quickly identify and limit the distribution of extremist content. Collaboration should prioritize respecting human rights and privacy laws.

3. Utilize existing organizations like the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to facilitate rapid response and information sharing. Encourage more tech companies and NGOs to participate.

4. Internet providers and intermediaries should establish and enforce policies to restrict access to extremist content, taking more proactive measures.

5. Develop and implement protocols for crisis situations that involve coordination between internet platforms, governments, research institutions, and civil society to swiftly counteract the spread of violent content while respecting human rights.

**Prohibit Praise and Glorification**

Platforms should ban the praise and glorification of violent actors and designated violent events to prevent their normalization.

**Designate Terrorist Organizations**

Encourage countries and international organizations to designate known terrorist organizations, like Hamas, which can limit their official exposure and reach online.
2. Policy Recommendations by WJC (cont’d)

**Education and Digital Literacy**

1. Invest in Counter Narratives
   - Fund and support civil society stakeholders and non-profit organizations actively engaged in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. These organizations can develop and promote counter-narratives and real-world intervention strategies.
   - Establish confidential and secure intervention portals to enable CVE organizations to proactively reach individuals susceptible to extremism

2. Incentivize Content Marketing
   - Incentivize companies to provide free content-marketing opportunities for CVE campaigns on mainstream social media platforms. This can help amplify counter-narratives and promote a positive online environment.

**Education and Awareness**

1. Promote digital literacy and critical thinking skills to empower individuals to identify and reject extremist content.
2. Encourage educational institutions to integrate media literacy and online ethics into their curricula.

**Research and Evaluation**

1. Invest in research to understand the evolving tactics of extremist groups online following the events of October 7th 2023.
2. Regularly evaluate and update policies and strategies based on emerging threats and changing online dynamics.

**Global Cooperation**

Promote international cooperation and information sharing among governments, NGOs, tech companies, and other stakeholders to develop a more unified approach to combating online extremism.
3. Propaganda - Mapping Hamas Social Footprint

On October 7 2023, at approximately 6:30AM, the Hamas terrorist organization launched an unprecedented attack on Israel through land, air, and sea. As Hamas terrorists entered Israel on October 7, the organization’s media units quickly began ramping up the “Al Aqsa Flood”, the campaign name designated by them, content on Telegram, providing graphic photos, videos, and news updates about their terror campaign in near-real time. While the group maintains a limited social media footprint, largely restricted to a series of interconnected Telegram channels, the “Al Aqsa Flood” campaign began trending on social media within hours of the attack. Some of the earliest posts from Hamas’ militant wing, the Qassam Brigade, were reposted to X/Twitter within as little as 60 seconds after the original posts on Telegram. These posts included graphic imagery of the Hamas terror attacks, including wounded hostages and dead bodies, alongside battle footage recorded by Hamas militants.¹

What began on Telegram was trending on X/Twitter by the end of October 7, while other major platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok were quickly flooded with campaign-related content, which included graphic and violent photos and videos that dehumanized Jews and praised the terror attacks. Many of the aforementioned platforms have removed thousands of pieces of graphic content from the attacks; however, there remains a significant amount that continues to circulate online.²

Hamas’ Telegram presence can help to better understand the outsized influence that the organization had on the wider social media landscape in the initial days of the conflict. In order to map Hamas’ official social footprint on Telegram, we identified the earliest channels on Telegram promoting the Al-Aqsa Flood hashtags in Arabic and English on October 7. Those channels were used as a seed list for identifying other related channels through message forwarding and reposts.

That list was then filtered down to 11 channels that represent Hamas, its leadership, and its militant wing, the Qassam Brigades. Leveraging OSINT (open-source) tools that include Telemetr.io and Telepathy, we analyzed each channel’s follower counts, content, and engagement metrics.

¹ In recent years, official Hamas-affiliated social media accounts have largely been suspended by most mainstream social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, forcing the group to rely on its supporter networks to distribute content on the aforementioned platforms.

3.1. Social Footprint Analysis

Hamas’ social footprint on Telegram consists of 11 channels - five are associated with the group’s militant wing, the Qassam Brigades, two belong to the Hamas Information Office, and four belong to the group’s Politboro, including Ishmael Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas Politboro, and Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas’ head of West Bank Affairs.

In total, the Hamas network on Telegram has a total audience of 1.45 Million Telegram users, a 171% increase in its audience compared to October 6, the day before the attacks were launched into Israel.

The **Qassam Brigades (683K Followers) and its spokesman Abu Ubeida (414K Followers)**, who represent the most followed channels in the network, were two of the first Telegram accounts to post the hashtag online as the attacks unfolded.\(^3\)

### Hamas and Qassam Brigade Official Telegram Channels Follower Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Follower Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades</td>
<td>638,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 1 (Qassam)</td>
<td>414,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - Gaza</td>
<td>149,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades (Gaza)</td>
<td>66,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 2 (Qassam)</td>
<td>57,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades (West Bank)</td>
<td>27,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas Information Office</td>
<td>23,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - West Bank</td>
<td>21,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismael Haniyeh</td>
<td>7,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezzat al-Rashq</td>
<td>4,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh al-Arouri</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the group’s militant wing has generated the biggest audience on Telegram, Hamas’ Information Office and its head, Ezzat al-Rishq, generated the highest percentages of growth. It is worth noting that both Telegram channels had less than 1,000 followers on October 6 - by October 16, **Hamas Information Office had more than 23,000 Telegram followers (2,661% increase) and Ezzat al-Rishq had more than 4,200 Telegram followers (1,205% increase).**

### Hamas and Qassam Brigade Official Telegram Channels Audience Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Audience Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas Information Office</td>
<td>2,661%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezzat al-Rashq</td>
<td>1,205%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - Gaza</td>
<td>260%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades</td>
<td>240%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - West Bank</td>
<td>213%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 1 (Qassam)</td>
<td>149%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 2 (Qassam)</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismael Haniyeh</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh al-Arouri</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades (Gaza)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades (West Bank)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Abu Ubeida, the Qassam spokesman, was the first Telegram account to post graphic imagery of dead Israelis in near-real time.
3.2. Al-Aqsa Flood Social Media Campaign

Official Hamas-affiliated accounts have been largely suspended by major social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Therefore, the content associated with the Telegram network provides the best insight into the campaign blueprints. To better understand the role played by Hamas Telegram Network in the Al-Aqsa Flood social media campaign, we analyzed all of the content posted by each channel from October 7-16.

On Telegram, channels associated with the group’s militant wing, the Qassam Brigade, were responsible for more than 70% of all posts created by the Hamas network between October 7-15. The Politburo and its organizational leadership were responsible for 24% of the total number of posts, while the Hamas Information Office represented the least.

The volume of content produced by the group dropped significantly in the days after the attack, reducing from 1,617 posts on October 7 to 426 posts on October 11, a 73% decrease in post volume. It remains unclear what has caused this drop of content and whether there was a strategic decision on the part of Hamas or other circumstances.
3.2. Al-Aqsa Flood Social Media Campaign (cont’d)

As the attacks in Israel began on October 7, the Hamas Telegram network began planting the seeds for the Al-Aqsa Flood campaign on social media, which was already rife with eyewitness and victim reports about gunshots and Hamas militants inside Israeli territory.

The first official posts from the Hamas Telegram Network came from Qassam spokesperson Abu Ubeida and the Qassam Brigades channels, followed shortly thereafter by unofficial and official Hamas Telegram channels.

These posts included graphic imagery of the Hamas terror attacks, including wounded hostages and dead bodies, alongside battle footage recorded by Hamas militants. Several pieces of content that originated on Telegram were quickly reposted to X/Twitter, sometimes within as little as 60 seconds after the original post, underscoring the potential for some degree of cross-platform social media coordination.

*(NOTE: All timestamps are in Eastern Standard Time)*

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3.2. Al-Aqsa Flood Social Media Campaign (cont’d)

The hashtag was first posted by Abu Ubeida’s (Qassam Spokesperson) Telegram account at 7:57 local time on October 7 alongside extremely graphic imagery.5

- TRANSLATION: #Preliminary photos of the Qassam elite forces inside our occupied territories during the Battle of #Flood_Al-Aqsa

The hashtag was posted by the Qassam Brigades Telegram account at 8:19 local time on October 7. The earliest iterations of the post on X/Twitter occurred in the minutes before and after the Telegram post.6

- TRANSLATION: “So they probed through the lands, and it was a promise fulfilled. #Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The hashtag was then posted by Hamas (Gaza) Telegram account 9:50 local time on October 7. The post that followed at 9:54 local time included eight different images from the terror attacks, including multiple graphic photos of dead Israeli soldiers. The earliest copies of the photos that were identified on X/Twitter were reposted less than one minute after the initial Telegram posts.7

- TRANSLATION: “Al-Qassam Brigades || after a while, Initial photos of the Qassam elite forces inside our occupied territories during the Battle of #Al-Aqsa_Flood.”

The hashtag was posted again by the official Qassam Brigades Telegram account at 10:22 local time on October 7 alongside a 1 minute and 53 second video showing graphic scenes of Israeli soldiers and civilians killed near the Kerem Shalom Border Crossing between Gaza and Israel. The earliest copy of the video that was identified on X/Twitter was reposted 21 minutes after the original post on Telegram.8

- TRANSLATION: “Exclusive scenes of the seizure of a kibbutz and the Kerem Shalom site east of Rafah during the Battle of #Al-Aqsa_Flood.”

The hashtag was posted again by the official Qassam Brigades Telegram account at 10:51 local time on October 7 alongside a 41 second video of Hamas militants training for the cross-border terror attacks into Israel. The video was first reposted to X/Twitter four minutes after the original post on Telegram.9

- TRANSLATION: “Exclusive scenes of the “Saqr” squadron, one of the military units that participated in Operation #Al-Aqsa_Flood inside our occupied territories.”

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5 Telegram - Abu Ubeida - https://t.me/aboabaaida/16538; The earliest instances of these images cannot be confirmed due to the likelihood that the content has largely been removed from Twitter.
6 Telegram - Qassam Brigades - https://t.me/qassambrigades/28312; Twitter @ma7moud107 (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017170252/https://twitter.com/ma7moud107/status/1710525409362591777
7 Telegram - Hamas Gaza - https://t.me/hamasps/16207; Twitter @HShaqrah (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017170252/https://twitter.com/HShaqrah/status/1710549174339473613
8 Earlier iterations of the video were likely taken down by Meta, Twitter, and other social media platforms; Telegram - Qassam Brigades - https://t.me/qassambrigades/28326; Twitter @ALABDAL_BH (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017170252/https://twitter.com/ALABDAL_BH/status/1710563970145230927
9 Hamas Brigades - https://t.me/qassambrigades/28328; Twitter - @Yamhday (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017164117/https://twitter.com/yamhday/status/171056457451082195
3.2. Al-Aqsa Flood Social Media Campaign (cont’d)

The hashtag was posted by Abu Ubeida’s (Qassam Spokesperson) Telegram account again at 10:58 local time on October 7 alongside videos of hostages being driven in a golf cart. The video was reposted to X/Twitter less than 60 seconds after it was initially shared on Telegram.\(^\text{10}\)

- TRANSLATION: “Families of settlers were transferred to the Gaza Strip [3 fire emojis]”

Hashtag posted by Hamas West Bank Telegram account at 12:02 local time on October 7. The Telegram post included video showing Hamas militants targeting a Jewish settlement in Arbouna, located east of the Jenin, in the West Bank. The video was quickly reposted by pro-Hamas accounts on Twitter within five minutes of the original posts on Telegram.\(^\text{11}\)

- TRANSLATION: “As part of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, the Al-Qassam Brigades in Jenin Camp attack a settlers’ car on the street adjacent to the village of Arbouna, east of the city of Jenin.”

The initial content seeded by Hamas-affiliated Telegram channels was quickly cross-posted to mainstream platforms en masse. On October 7 alone, there were more than 330,000 tweets, over 16,000 Facebook posts, and nearly 1,000 posts on Instagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mentions of the al-Aqsa Flood Hashtag (Arabic &amp; English)</th>
<th>10.7 - 10.15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X/Twitter</td>
<td>400k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>300k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instagram</td>
<td>200k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Sources: Brandwatch, Crowdtangle, (Facebook, Instagram, and X/Twitter)

\(^\text{10}\) Telegram - Abo Ubeida - https://t.me/aboabaaida/16594; Twitter - @SawsanH39 (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017162348/https://twitter.com/SawsanH39/status/17105653561486846831
\(^\text{11}\) Telegram - Hamas West Bank - https://t.me/hamas_wb/2558; Twitter - @Suatkicts (Archive) - https://web.archive.org/web/20231017160156/https://twitter.com/Suatkicts/status/171056270316931984
On the whole, the number of posts using the hashtag in English or Arabic decreased significantly over the next few days. By October 11, there was a 69% decrease in overall mentions of the al-Aqsa Flood hashtag on Facebook, Instagram, and X/Twitter; however, by that time, the hashtag had been trending consistently on Twitter, with mentions exceeding 1 Million posts in the first five days. It remains unclear and data has yet to be provided as to what extent of the reduction in volume was due to policies put in place by Meta, X/Twitter, and others to restrict visibility and/or take down relevant content for violating platform Terms of Service.

The aforementioned social media companies have prohibited Hamas accounts for years, while also continuing to remove new ones in a constant game of whack-a-mole. Regardless of their own actions, Telegram's decision to allow the group to continue to organize on the platform has had dire consequences for the rest of the Internet.

Telegram founder Pavel Durov recently defended his stance on Hamas in an interview with CNN, claiming that Telegram doesn’t promote content algorithmically and therefore Hamas channels “serve as a unique source of first-hand information for researchers, journalists and fact-checkers.”

In a similarly concerning but different development, Hamas’ active presence on Telegram has led to an increasing number of far-right and neo-Nazi groups not only consuming Hamas content in real-time, but sharing it emphatically with their own supporters to celebrate the death of Jews.

Neo-nazi and far-right groups in the US, particularly those who implement various forms of firearms and weapons training, have long sought to bring about an apocalyptic race war, and view Hamas in an aspirational context. On a more practical level, individuals are sharing clips of various Hamas attacks against Israeli military and civilians as evidence of how to successfully implement guerilla warfare tactics against an asymmetrical more powerful military.

In 2022, two men affiliated with the Boogaloo movement were sentenced to several years in prison for conspiring to provide material support to Hamas. The two men met with an undercover FBI agent that they believed to be a member of Hamas in 2020, offering material support, including manufacturing gun parts like suppressors and 3-D printed auto sears for use against Israeli and military personnel overseas.
4. Disinformation - “False Flag” Conspiracies

As platform trust and safety teams scrambled to address content moderation issues associated with the hashtag and its accompanying campaign content, global threat actors began planting other conspiracy theories about the conflict on various platforms. The myriad of claims that emerged opened the door to an information ecosystem that has become rife with anti-Semitic content that dehumanizes Israel and global Jewry at-large.

Since October 7, Qanon influencers, pro-Russian conspiracy theorists, and Hamas supporters around the world have been pushing claims that the Hamas terror attacks in Israel were part of a global false flag operation to initiate the “Great Reset” conspiracy.\footnote{OGallagher, Aoife, and Ciaran O’Connor. “The ‘Great Reset.’” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 21 Mar. 2023, https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/the-great-reset/.}

False flag conspiracies claim that events were perpetrated by someone other than the official suspect, hiding their involvement through various forms of deception and subterfuge. Unfortunately, false flag conspiracies have become increasingly commonplace in response to high-profile breaking news events, particularly in the age of social media.\footnote{Starbird, Kate. “Examining the Alternative Media Ecosystem through the Production of Alternative Narratives of Mass Shooting Events on Twitter.” Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2017. https://faculty.washington.edu/kstarbi/Alt_Narratives_ICWSM17-CameraReady.pdf.}


Within hours of the first reports about the Hamas attacks in Israel, “false flag” claims began emerging on mainstream social media platforms. These claims suggested the involvement of the Israeli government or other Israeli entities in planning the attack, presumably with a hidden agenda. These alleged motivations ranged from “Palestinian genocide” to “world war III” or a globalist “one world government.”
4.1. Content Analysis

Less than 24 hours after Hamas launched its attack, viral posts claiming it was a false flag began circulating on social media. While the volume of mentions has decreased since the attack, similar to other major terrorist events in the past, the “false flag” narrative could remain prominent in the service of antisemitic propaganda in the years to come.

Some of the popular posts on mainstream and fringe platforms have linked the event to historical events like the 9/11 attacks, the USS Liberty incident, and COVID-19 to claim that Israel and the Jewish Diaspora are using “false flags” as a common practice to quietly implement a hidden global agenda.
4.1. Content Analysis (cont’d)

Some of the most popular “false flag” claims originated on social media content produced by Israeli citizens who claimed to have access to inside information about the attacks. Various blog posts and videos referencing Israeli content promoting the “false flag” conspiracy began amassing millions of views.

An Israeli conspiracy theorist, Efrat Fenigson, who claimed to serve in Israeli intelligence, suggested on October 7 that Hamas’ success was “a planned operation on all fronts.” Similarly to “Great Reset” conspiracist she then tying the event to a corrupt government that pour resources “on agendas such as COVID, climate, judicial reform […] and many more.” Her video was cited by multiple conspiracy theorists, including the most viral articles on social media.18

- A video by an Israeli woman claiming to be a former IDF soldier argued that it is impossible that Israeli forces did not see Hamas militants crossing the border.

But more alarming are attempts by some political influencers to adopt an adjacent conspiracy theory of an “enemy from within.” On October 12, an American conservative political influencer echoed a claim heard by several Israeli far right influencers,21 that Netanyahu was either “double crossed by bad agents” or that there are “traitors that have infiltrated [the Israeli government or intelligence].” Those claims were later twisted on social media as antisemitic accounts spread an edited segment, with the hashtag #BibiKnew.22

Many of the video clips and photos that have been incorporated into the “false flag” conspiracy were taken out of context or intentionally distorted.

- Pro-Hamas accounts circulated footage from the Nova Music Festival, falsely claiming that Israeli soldiers were firing at Hamas militants, and that civilians were caught in the crossfire.23

- An American conspiracy theorist posted a fabricated document to X/Twitter falsely suggesting that funding for the “false flag” operation came from the United States as part of an aid package to Israel.24

- On Oct. 9, clips from a Palestinian movie began circulating online alongside claims that Israeli media is staging the attacks using actors and film crews.25

- Doctored images of Israeli soldiers near the Gaza border fence were posted alongside claims that the IDF knowingly allowed Hamas militants into Israel.26

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19 Twitter, @MAVERIC68078049, 8, Oct. 2023. (archive: https://archive.ph/cbA6E)
20 YouTube, @Valuetainment, 12 Oct., 2023 (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20231019211716/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPx1muBhZCo&t=1724s)
21 Twitter. @bodkim2022, 7 Oct. 2023, (archive: https://archive.ph/oUByl).
24 Twitter, @Prolotario1, 7 Oct. 2023. (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20231019233547https://twitter.com/Prolotario1/status/1710721615804150049)
4.2. False Flag Superspreaders

Content explicitly mentioning a “false flag” attack in Israel has proliferated across all mainstream and fringe social media platforms; however, several platforms appear to be taking a more proactive approach to curb its spread. TikTok now prevents users from searching for content associated with the hashtag #falseflag, while continuing to take down a number of posts using it to reference the Hamas terror attacks in Israel.

On Meta platforms, YouTube and in particular on X/Twitter, some of the most popular posts pushing the conspiracy were posted by verified users (with checkmarks), and in most cases with no content warnings, labels or filters. It is important to note that **many of the key superspreaders of the false flag conspiracy in Israel have been previously associated with state-sponsored influence operations, pro-Hamas propaganda, as well as a range of antisemitic far-right communities** on and offline.

**Digital Media**

- **Globalresearch(.)ca** - The US State Department has described the Canadian website as “deeply enmeshed in Russia’s broader disinformation and propaganda ecosystem.” On October 9, they posted an article referencing videos made by Israeli conspiracy theorist Efrat Fenigson, alongside claims that it was planned to justify Palestinian genocide.27

- **The People’s Voice** - The administrator of the website, Sean Adl-Tabatabai, has been accused of using his network of websites as a proxy for the Russian government, some of which have been blacklisted by the European Union’s East StratCom Task Force (ESCTF). Articles posted to the website feature headlines like “Insider Admits Israel Attack Was ‘False Flag’ To Start ‘Holy War’ and Usher In ‘One World Government’.”28

**YouTube**

- **Valuetainment (4.95 Million subscribers)** - The popular conservative YouTube channel repeatedly raised doubts about the attacks, suggesting in an October 12 podcast that a surprise attack from Hamas was implausible given the circumstances.29

- **Rachel Blevins (27K subscribers)** - The former RT America anchor uploaded a video on October 9 claiming that Israel chose not to listen to Egyptian intelligence warnings about the attack because it wants to “leave Gaza in ruins.”30

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4.2. False Flag Superspreaders (cont’d)

X/Twitter

- @mattwallace888 (1.3M followers) - Matt Wallace, a self-described cryptocurrency influencer, used his verified account on X/Twitter in the hours after the Hamas terror attacks to declare that “THE ELITES ARE ABOUT TO START WW3 WITH A FALSE FLAG”. According to X/Twitter’s publicly available metrics, the October 7 tweet has been viewed by more than 3.4 Million users on the platform.\(^{31}\)

- @dom_lucre (744K followers) - Dom Lucre is an American conspiracy theorist who was temporarily suspended from X/Twitter for posting content that depicted child sexual abuse. On his verified account, his claims about a “false flag” attack in Israel were viewed over 2 Million times.\(^{32}\)

- @ShadowofEzra (130K followers) - The pseudonymous account belongs to a prominent QAnon influencer who claimed that Israel “let it happen or they made it happen.” On X/Twitter, it has been viewed by more than 1.1 Million users since October 7.\(^{33}\)

TikTok

- @mandingochavez - The account has since been suspended for violating the platform’s Terms of Service, but not before posting an edited version of a widely shared video clip of an American conservative political influencer suggesting that the Israeli government knew about Hamas attacks in advance and ordered military forces to stand down. Though the account was taken down, copies of the video continue to circulate on TikTok and other platforms.\(^{34}\)

- @Mindset_Compass (14K followers) - A far-right conspiracy account known for posting about gender identity issues in the US has posted multiple videos claiming that the Israeli government had preexisting knowledge about the attacks. One of the videos had gained nearly 1 Million views before it was taken down, while another has already generated more than 380,000 views since October 16.\(^{35}\)

---


\(^{34}\) Tiktok, @crunchyconservati, 16, Oct, 2023. (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/2023102004749/https://twitter.com/crunchyconservati/video/729040485582114332)

4.2. False Flag Superspreaders (cont’d)

Instagram
- Thefreethoughtproject (412K followers) - The account has a long history of posting pro-Russian conspiracy theories, and speculated in several posts that Israel sought to increase its foreign aid package by conducting “false flag” attacks on October 7.\(^{36}\)

- Mymaria777 (75K followers) - The account frequently posts geopolitical conspiracy theories. Since October 7, the Instagram user has shared several “false flag” claims referencing footage from the Nova Music Festival.\(^{37}\)

Facebook
- SyrianGirl - Maram Susli (45K followers) - The Syrian-Australian conspiracy theorist has a long history of contributing stories to Russian and Iranian state-run media websites, as well as the US-based InfoWars conspiracy website. Her post about the Nova Music Festival on October 10 gained over 79,000 views on Facebook, and it has since been widely shared by pro-Hamas accounts on other social media platforms.\(^{38}\)

Rumble (Fringe Platform)
- The People’s Voice (47K followers) - An October 10 video promoting an article on his site about the “false flag” conspiracy has gained more than 600,000 views on Rumble, a less moderated fringe alternative to YouTube.\(^{39}\)

Gab (Fringe Platform)
- @realAlexJones (218K followers) - The American conspiracy theorist and founder of InfoWars posted a link to a video titled “Must Watch Video: WEF Kingpin Yuval Noah Harari Exposes Netanyahu False Flag” that has gained more than 69,000 views.\(^{40}\)

Beyond the wide array of non-state actors are a number of individuals with known or alleged ties to state-run media entities, all of whom have a long history of promoting antisemitism online. In many ways, the emergence of the “false flag” conspiracies about Israel highlighted the ideological convergence between a wide range of pro-Hamas and far-right communities around the world.

Additionally, there have been discussions within the Israeli far-right about a suspected “enemy within” that betrayed the Netanyahu government, claims that have been used to further the wider “false flag” narrative around the world. This development introduces a complex challenge to efforts aimed at combating the growing tide of antisemitism in response to the Hamas terror attacks in Israel.

\(^{36}\) Instagram, @freethoughtproject. 11, Oct. 2023. (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20231020010254/https://www.instagram.com/p/CyRA_XWRU1g/?img_index=1)


\(^{40}\) Gab, @RealAlexJones. 16, Oct, 2023. (archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20231020013907/https://gab.com/RealAlexJones/posts/111247063304108121)
5. Radicalization - /CHIP/

Since the launch of Hamas’ terror campaign on October 7, there has been a notable surge in pro-Hamas propaganda on 4chan /pol/ in the form of daily threads called /CHIP/, aka “Comfy Happenings in Palestine.” The recurring threads are dedicated to website links, and social media content, often graphic in nature, that dehumanize Israeli soldiers, civilians, and Diaspora Jews at-large. The threads feature a combination of far-right antisemitism and anti-Israel geopolitical views, much of which appear to be influenced by news sites associated with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese governments.

While there are few, if any, explicit links between Hamas media entities and the emergence of the /CHIP/ threads, much of the content featured in these threads comes from Hamas, as well as a range of state-sponsored media outlets in Iran, Russia and China. Oftentimes, the content is later reposted on mainstream social media platforms, including X/Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and Reddit among others.
5.1. 4Chan

4chan has long served as a content hub of hate speech and disinformation for a wide variety of organized hate groups, conspiracy theorists, and state-sponsored influence operators both online and in the real world. The platform has dozens of topical boards, and /pol/, otherwise known as /politically incorrect/, was created so that 4chan moderators could direct the site’s most vitriolic and xenophobic users there and quarantine it from less toxic message boards on the site. The /politically incorrect/ message board has long been known for its widespread use of offensive speech, xenophobia and hate, often considered to be a ground zero for new generations of trolls, and one of the darker corners of the open web.\footnote{Hine, Gabriel, et al. “Kek, Cucks, and God Emperor Trump: A Measurement Study of 4chan’s Politically Incorrect Forum and Its Effects on the Web.” Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, vol. 11, no. 1, 3 May 2017, pp. 92-101, https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v11i1.14893; boyd, danah. “‘For the Lolz’: 4chan Is Hacking the Attention Economy.” Apophenia, 10 June 2010. zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/06/12/for-the-lolz-4chan-is-hacking-the-attention-economy.html. Accessed 15 June 2023.}

In recent years, state-sponsored influence operators have tried to exploit the platform’s nihilistic community on /pol/ to sow discord in the West, using the messageboard to spread disinformation narratives about global elections, the COVID-19 Pandemic, and Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine among others.

4chan /pol/ users frequently spin up similar information avalanches around geopolitical conflicts around the world, most notably the pro-Russian /CHUG/ (Comfy Happening In Ukraine General) threads about the conflict in Ukraine.\footnote{“To Vilify Ukraine, The Kremlin Resorts to Antisemitism - United States Department of State.” United States Department of State, 11 July 2022, https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/to-vilify-ukraine-the-kremlin-resorts-to-antisemitism/}
5.2. /CHIP/

While 4chan /pol/ has a longstanding interest in sharing graphic footage from conflicts around the world, in some ways, the CHUG threads helped cement a new conversation format in which users could follow more structured and templated discussions about real-time geopolitical conflicts like the one unfolding in Israel and Gaza.

The first CHIP thread was created on 4chan on Oct. 7, several hours after Hamas launched its attack. Over the first 96 hours of the conflict, there were already over 50 discussion threads devoted to CHIP, each filled with hundreds of individual user comments.

The CHIP threads on 4chan /pol/ are created 10-20 times every day. Each thread begins with a short news update alongside several types of links: YouTube livestreams, news websites, maps, and graphic video clips from the current conflict that are accessible via anonymous file hosting websites like Catbox and Rentry.

Total Volume of /CHIP/ Threads on 4chan | 10.7 - 10.15

![Screenshot of a typical CHIP thread opening post. (source:4plebs)](https://4pleb.com/thread/7807679)

Data Sources: JAVELIN+ - 4chan
5.2. /CHIP/ (cont’d)

The threads feature a combination of far-right antisemitism and anti-Israel geopolitical views, much of which appear to be influenced by news sites associated with government agencies. Three of the ten most frequently shared news websites are RT.com, a global news site associated with the Russian government, al-Mayadeen, a pro-Hezbollah news network alleged to be financed by the Iranian government, and the YouTube channel of CGTN, the Chinese state-run English network, that frequently shares disinformation narratives on social media.43

Rentry, an anonymous text-based file-sharing platform, features several CHIP-related files, including one with a list of over 150 different graphic and violent combatant videos hosted on Catbox. It is important to note that some of these videos were among the initial clips shared by official Hamas-affiliated Telegram channels, and the majority of the content has already been removed from mainstream social media platforms.44

Following the original post, anonymous 4chan users post comments about ongoing news developments, share website and social media links, alongside a large volume of antisemitic far-right antisemitic memes. Many thread contributors participate in organized campaigns to amplify antisemitic content on other platforms, most notably X/Twitter, where they have historically had the most success in hacking the attention economy of the digital public square.45

The convergence of far-right and racist ideologies with support for Hamas becomes evident through the memes featured in these discussions. Since October 7, users have shared dozens of memes endorsing Hamas attacks against Israel. These memes typically consist of animated images that celebrate Hamas militants, often glorifying actions such as beheadings of Israeli soldiers and the killing of Israeli civilians. In other images, users post a variety of iterations of the “Happy Merchant Meme”, a popular white supremacist image designed to propagate antisemitic tropes on 4chan.46

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It’s important to note that 4chan threads frequently contain offensive memes and echo antisemitic themes about other topics, including other geopolitical conflicts around the world. However, it is significant that these memes now explicitly express support for Hamas and Islamic terrorism to a greater extent, a notable ideological shift that has occurred in the wake of the October 7 terror attacks in Israel.

While the thread is dedicated to events in Israel and Gaza, a word analysis of all of the Original Posts (OP) in the /CHIP/ threads since October 7 shows how the discussions often try to blame Israel for the war in Ukraine and the European immigration crisis. Antisemitic phrases are used constantly through the threaded discussions. Borrowing from another white supremacist trope on 4chan, the term TKD, which stands for “Total Kike Death”, has become increasingly popular in /CHIP/ threads on 4chan. On October 7, there were less than 10 mentions, however, within days, TKD was being used at least 200 times per day.
With this in mind, it is important to revisit the ways in which far-right and neo-Nazi groups in the West, many of whom have long sought to bring about an apocalyptic race war, have increasingly viewed Hamas in an aspirational context. In the first case study, we explored the ways in which these groups are promoting Hamas content on Telegram, however, on 4chan, the potential offline consequences are arguably far more concerning.

4chan’s /politically incorrect/ message board, the hub of all CHIP-related discussions, has been cited by a range of far-right mass shooters as heavily influential to their online radicalization journeys. In Christchurch, New Zealand, and the spate of mass shootings that followed, including the Chabad of Poway synagogue shooting in April 2019 and the Halle synagogue shooting in Germany in October 2019, the perpetrators posted manifestos on 4chan /pol/, where they were widely circulated on and off platform. In this regard, the canonization of mass shooters has become a core ideological pillar of the message board culture.

With an online community that is already predisposed to strong antisemitic belief systems, the introduction of Hamas propaganda and state-sponsored antisemitic conspiracy theories on 4chan /pol/ becomes a force multiplier for potential threats of violence to the Jewish community at-large.

By tapping into a digitally savvy online community known for its promotion of violent extremism, Hamas and its network of online supporters have virtually guaranteed that the Al Aqsa Flood social media campaign content will live on for years. 4chan /pol/ users have already, through anonymous file hosting services, created archives and backups of Hamas content that has largely been taken down from social media, some of which continues to be shared off platform on a near daily basis.

In many ways, the /CHIP/ threads show how state-sponsored media networks easily circumvent content moderation efforts on major social media platforms to target Western audiences on virtually unmoderated platforms like 4chan. There they can promote anti-Israel narratives and conspiracies to far-right audiences in the West that are already predisposed to antisemitism, creating a dangerous ideological cocktail that is likely to have both on and offline consequences. As noted in the first case study, two members of the Boogaloo militia, an anti-government movement with some roots in the 4chan community, were sentenced to several years in prison for conspiring to provide material support to Hamas in 2022.47

47 “Second ‘Boogaloo Boys’ Member Sentenced to Prison for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Hamas.” United States Department of Justice, 1 June 2022, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/second-boogaloo-boys-member-sentenced-prison-conspiring-provide-material-support-hamas
6. Conclusion

The al-Aqsa Flood campaign and the torrent of anti-Israel conspiracies that emerged in its wake highlight the ways in which Hamas was able to exploit the platform dynamics of major social media companies, hijacking the feedback loop between real-world events and online discourse. They quickly gained support from a wide range of ideological allies online who began using discussions about the conflict to promote antisemitic narratives online. The three case studies highlight a few of the ways that this content is promoting extremist propaganda, disinformation, and radicalization to worldwide audiences on social media.

Despite having limited access to mainstream social media platforms, Hamas’ Telegram network had an outsized impact on the larger social media discussions in the immediate wake of the terror attacks that took place in Israel on October 7. The first case study demonstrated Hamas’ effectiveness in dominating discussions about the attacks in real-time on social media, mirroring messaging strategies previously used by Islamic terrorist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The majority of Hamas-produced content on social media came from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ militant wing, which continues to proliferate across both mainstream and fringe social media platforms.48

As the al-Aqsa Flood hashtag and its related pro-Hamas content trended on social media, “false flag” conspiracies about Israel's secret knowledge of the incoming attacks and deep state cabals began to emerge as a viral sub-narrative to the entire Israel-Gaza conflict. The intense chatter allowed a variety of non-state and state actors to revive old tropes about Jewish power, highlighting the ideological convergence between pro-Hamas, and far-right communities around the world. This convergence of both political fringes was quickly exploited by nation-state actors like Iran and Russia to promote antisemitic and anti-Israel content among Western audiences.

The third case study shows how these state actors are actively shaping an ideological bridge between pro-Hamas communities online and far-right audiences in the West over their shared hatred of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora on virtually unmoderated message boards like 4chan.

As has been noted throughout the three case studies, major technology companies have prohibited Hamas accounts for years, yet they have also struggled to keep up with the general pace of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Regardless of their own actions, Telegram’s decision to allow the group to continue to organize on the platform has had dire consequences for the rest of the Internet. It will virtually ensure that Hamas’ propaganda from the October 7 terror attacks will continue to percolate on social media, instilling fear into Jewish communities in Israel and around the world for years to come.

7. Appendix 1

**CASE STUDY 1:** Hamas Telegram Network - Audience Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Link</th>
<th>Followers on 10/6</th>
<th>Followers on 10/16</th>
<th>Follower Growth</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades 1</td>
<td>Militant</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/qassambrigades">https://t.me/qassambrigades</a></td>
<td>200,848</td>
<td>683,235</td>
<td>+240%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 1 (Qassam)</td>
<td>Militant</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/spokesman_2020">https://t.me/spokesman_2020</a></td>
<td>166,200</td>
<td>414,179</td>
<td>+149%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ubeida 2 (Qassam)</td>
<td>Militant</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/aboabaaida">https://t.me/aboabaaida</a></td>
<td>30,755</td>
<td>57,185</td>
<td>+85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades (West Bank)</td>
<td>Militant</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/qassam_WB">https://t.me/qassam_WB</a></td>
<td>25,937</td>
<td>27,458</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassam Brigades 2</td>
<td>Militant</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/cnirs">https://t.me/cnirs</a></td>
<td>57,374</td>
<td>66474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamas Information Office</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/HamasOnline">https://t.me/HamasOnline</a></td>
<td>847</td>
<td>23,390</td>
<td>+2,661%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - Gaza</td>
<td>Politboro</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/hamasps">https://t.me/hamasps</a></td>
<td>41,468</td>
<td>149,436</td>
<td>+260%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas - West Bank</td>
<td>Politboro</td>
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<td>6,833</td>
<td>21,395</td>
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<td>Ishamel Haniyeh</td>
<td>Politboro</td>
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<td>Saleh al-Arouri</td>
<td>Politboro</td>
<td><a href="https://t.me/Palestineonline2">https://t.me/Palestineonline2</a></td>
<td>727</td>
<td>913</td>
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<td>Ezzat al-Rishq</td>
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<td>324</td>
<td>4,229</td>
<td>+1,205%</td>
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</table>
Hamas Telegram Posts on Twitter

NOTE: All timestamps are in Eastern Standard Time
### 7. Appendix 1 (cont’d)

#### Hamas Telegram Network - Posts per Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Qassam Brigade</th>
<th>Abu Ubeida 1 (Qassam)</th>
<th>Abu Ubeida 2 (Qassam)</th>
<th>Qassam Brigade (West Bank)</th>
<th>Qassam Information Office</th>
<th>Hamas - Gaza</th>
<th>Hamas - West Bank</th>
<th>Ishamel Haniyeh</th>
<th>Saleh al-Arouqi</th>
<th>Ezzat al-Rishq</th>
<th>Overall Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>10/7</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Channel TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,928</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,509</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>574</strong></td>
<td><strong>268</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>367</strong></td>
<td><strong>196</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Al-Aqsa Flood Hashtag Campaign - Posts per Day on Mainstream Social Media Platforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>X/Twitter</th>
<th>TOTAL (DAY)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/7</td>
<td>16,386</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>334,055</td>
<td>351,420</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/8</td>
<td>11,389</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>317,517</td>
<td>329,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9,839</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>197,383</td>
<td>207,983</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/10</td>
<td>8,264</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>144,439</td>
<td>153,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11</td>
<td>7,326</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>98,560</td>
<td>106,387</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/12</td>
<td>6,325</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>63,633</td>
<td>70,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/13</td>
<td>6,254</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>50,891</td>
<td>57,491</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/14</td>
<td>5,015</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>22,291</td>
<td>27,655</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/15</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>17,012</td>
<td>22,067</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL (PLATFORM)</strong></td>
<td><strong>75,483</strong></td>
<td><strong>5113</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,326,377</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CASE STUDY 2: “False Flag” Conspiracies Methodology and Excerpts

Methodology:

Memetica used several social listening tools to assess the volume and analyze mentions of “False Flag” conspiracy theories on mainstream social media platforms, digital media, and fringe communities, between October 6 and October 16, based on the following query:

("false flag" OR "falseflag") AND ("falseflag" OR "false flag") AND ("hamas" OR "israel" OR "idf" OR "bibi" OR "9/11" OR "zion" OR "gaza" OR OR "reim" OR "intel" OR "biden" OR "world war")

Memetica used network mapping techniques, and URL extractions tools to find key voices in the conversation, and main themes. The research was supplemented by utilization of Google’s Fact Check Explorer to find excerpts of misleading or false content that gained traction, and was identified as potentially contributing to the “false flag” grand narrative.

Instagram Excerpts:

ANOTHER 9/11 22 YEARS LATER

divergent.com

done by Mossad, Israel

dollarvigilante FALSE FLAG: Hamas is the creation of the Israeli Government and they planned these attacks and allowed them to happen to garner support for a mass genocide and likely leading to World War II. Share this please before it is too late. #Israel #Palestine #Gaza

Jason Bassler (@JasonBassler1)

Israel was warned by Egyptian intelligence. Israel ignored it. False flag? Let’s examine:
- Media narrative in sync
- Political condemnation in sync
- Calls for military escalation
- Demands for new funding
- American hostages

USS Liberty was first. Your liberty is next.

jason.e.bassler and thefreethoughtproject

They think they’re slick...

The media, politicians, celebrities, and even a presidential candidate utter the words “Unprovoked attack” nearly in unison over the past few days, which is historically inaccurate and factually incorrect. Now they are claiming Hamas “murdered babies.” American’s have been killed and are being held hostage. Nevertheless, here we go again and the war drums are beating.

What if the support for Ukraine was weak?

What if they knew we were furious about the billions being sent to Ukraine? What if they knew they had to flip the script, otherwise the narrative couldn’t continue to...

Liked by jacintz_b and others

OCTOBER 11
7. Appendix 2 (cont’d)

X/Twitter Excerpts:

**Insider Admits Israel Attack Was ‘False Flag’ To Start ‘Holy War’ and Usher In ‘One World Government’**

- **Matt Wallace**
  - @MattWallace888
  - 6:37 PM - Oct 7, 2023
  - WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME!!!
  - WILL BE EXPOSING EVERYTHING TONIGHT!!
  - Rate proposed Community Notes

- **Shadow of Ezra**
  - @ShadowofEzra
  - 11:28 AM - Oct 7, 2023
  - Here is your confirmation that the events taking place in Israel are a false flag.
  - How stupid can you be to believe that Hamas has the ability to invade Israel by land, air and sea?
  - Israel is one of the most protected and well funded nations in the world.
  - There is no chance that cavemen invaded them by land, air and sea.
  - They either let it happen or they made it happen.

- **Daniel Haqiqatjou**
  - @Haqiqatjou
  - Remember that Zionists constantly advance their policies through false-flag attacks blamed on Muslims. Notable examples are:
    - King David Hotel Bombing
    - Lavon Affair
    - USS Liberty incident
    - Amerithrax attacks
    - and most importantly: [REDACTED]
Facebook Excerpts:

SyrianGirl
October 10 at 12:51 PM

Overview Comments

Breaking 
IDF was firing at Hamas during the music festival from within the crowds - unarmed ravers were not targeted - they were caught in the cross fire!!! The Rave was right next to the militarised border fence.

TikTok Excerpts:

Exposing The Elite Agenda
October 15 at 1:30 PM

The Tonkin Incident was a false flag attack
The U.S.S. Liberty was a false flag attack
The Oklahoma Bombing was a false flag attack
9/11 was a false flag attack
The C.I.A. & Mossad train terrorist organizations
While countries fund both sides of conflict
Or they will fabricate a fear mongering campaign
Because acts of terror are a tool of the deep state

that a war is what the elites want
7. Appendix 2 (cont’d)

Rumble Excerpts:

- "HAMAS ATTACK WAS AN INSIDE JOB"
  - 9 days ago
  - Insider: Israel Attack Was 'False Flag' To Start 'Holy War' and Usher In 'One World Government'
  - The People's Voice
  - 773 likes, 11 dislikes, 599K views, 173 comments

- EGYPT EXPOSES ISRAELI FALSE FLAG! - Hamas Is A Front For Intelligence Agencies! - WAKE UP OR WW3!
  - 10 days ago
  - World Alternative Media
  - 114 likes, 0 dislikes, 9.83K views, 11 comments

Gab Excerpts:

- Alex Jones 🌍@RealAlexJones
  - 4d · BANNED
  - Must Watch Video: WEF Kingpin Yuval Noah Harari Exposes Netanyahu False Flag
  - battleplan.news/watch?id=652cb3d4e95a6accfa57...
  - 9 replies, 16 reposts