Visitors entering the Terror Haza [House of Terror] in Budapest are immediately confronted with the political agenda of the public foundation that operates this popular museum—one of the most visited attractions in the Hungarian capital. The building at 60 Andrássy Street has a tortured past. From 1937 until the end of the war, it served as a meeting place of the Hungarian Fascist party, the Arrow Cross [Nyilas]. Later, from 1945 until 1952, it was the headquarters of the Communist State Security Service. Today, victims of both systems are commemorated by a single monument composed of two pillars, each in the representative color of the political system whose victims it commemorates: one red, the other black. One bears the star of Communism, the other, the Arrow Cross symbol. The museum’s message is unmistakeable: Communism and Fascism are two sides of the same coin.

In his essay on modern European memory, the epilogue to his book, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, Tony Judt describes the Budapest Terror Haza as an example of the paradigm of the politics of memory being applied by post-Communist societies. The museum tells the story of all forms of state violence, torture, repression and dictatorship that took place in Hungary between 1944 and 1989—thereby equating the crimes of the Arrow Cross (in power from October 1944–April 1945) with those of the Communist regime that seized power after the end of the war.

Thus, the very significance of the year 1945—the victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany—is, to a certain extent, invalidated by the thesis of continuity. One cruel political regime was replaced by another, no less cruel, but with foreign roots. The
blueprint of the museum, which is reproduced in a booklet that visitors receive at the entrance, reveals a definite hierarchy of trauma and suffering. In fact, only three rooms are devoted to the destruction of the Jews of Hungary—a deed for which the Arrow Cross bore considerable responsibility. The rest of the large building is devoted to a graphic and highly politicized catalogue of the crimes of the Stalinist regime in Hungary. Indeed, the dramatic composition of the museum’s presentations and their emotional impact are clearly oriented to the presentation of the crimes of the Communist regime, while only paying mere lip service to the mass murder of the Jews of Hungary. It is also no coincidence that the Jewish origin of some of the perpetrators of the Communist crimes is stressed.

The evocative way in which the exhibition is presented, as well as the “division of suffering,” leave the visitor with no doubt at all that in the eyes of the curators of the museum, Communism was the worst of the two evils. To be sure, Budapest also has a recently opened “Holocaust Memorial Center,” but it has achieved little resonance in Hungarian society. “Much of the time, this Holocaust Center stands nearly empty, its exhibits and fact sheets seen by a thin trickle of visitors—many of them foreign. Meanwhile, on the other side of town, Hungarians have flocked to the Terror Haza.”

The central and immediate presence of the memorial to the victims of the Communist regime in the Budapest “memory landscape” stands in stark contrast to the peripheral position of the Holocaust Memorial, and this may well serve as a classic example of “the difficulty of incorporating the destruction of the Jews into contemporary memory in post-Communist Europe.” It seems that with few exceptions, only to the west of the former Iron Curtain is the Holocaust embedded in social memory (one may argue of course to what extent), while in post-Communist Eastern Europe, it is Communism that is the “hottest issue” of the politics of memory.

Does the phenomenon of memory mark a culturally defined border in modern Europe? Do the various “cultural patterns” of memory of the Gulag and the Holocaust—to use Stefan Troebst’s term for the competing positions of European memory—recreate the former borders between “East” and “West”—borders which were to have been overcome, and even eliminated, by the project of a common European memory?

II

There is no denying that the present cultures of memory are developing in very different directions, a pattern that began, paradoxically enough, in the course of the 1980s—the very decade during which the political myths of post-war Europe
lost their validity—first in Western Europe, and after 1989, in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. From 1945 onwards, and with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, virtually every European country, whether Communist or not, carefully cultivated its national image with reference to its immediate past and according to the master narrative of European “post-war myths.” The ideological gap between “East” and “West” played little role in the development of this political myth—countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain were able to maintain this approach, and to stylize it in accordance with individual national, ideological and historical ingredients and taste, well into the 1980s.

Judt maintained that “our own” people were the innocent victims of cruel suppression by a hostile aggressor. Heroic national resistance was celebrated, and any questions of collaboration with the Nazis had to be shifted as far away as possible from the light cast on Nazi crimes. Such historical narratives were of inestimable value, both in helping to unite a society still politically deeply divided following the subliminal Civil Wars of World War II, as well as re-integrating the politically fissured population. Of course, this could only be achieved by means of the complete denial of any local or national participation in the Nazi crimes.

The prevailing Austrian premise that Austria was actually “the first victim” of National Socialism is only one example—though perhaps the least tenable—in a whole galaxy of Western European post-war myths. Austrians refused to accept the fact that following the Anschluss in March 1938, Austria became an integral part of Nazi Germany and that Austrians willingly, and often enthusiastically, participated in the execution of the Nazi regime’s murderous policies. German sociologist M. Rainer Lepsius considers Austria—along with the [now defunct] German Democratic Republic—to be a “successor state” of the Third Reich. Those Western and Eastern European countries that were either German-occupied or politically allied with the Reich were able to present far stronger evidence to develop and uphold their own national narratives concerning repression under the Nazi regime and national, anti-Fascist resistance, both real and imagined.

The emotionally charged patterns of post-war myths had little place for the victims of Nazi persecution and extermination. The question of guilt and responsibility was projected entirely onto Germany (i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany), and commemoration of the victims of “racial persecution” (for the most part a polite euphemism for Jews) was left largely to the Jewish communities themselves. These victims had no role to play in the heroic narratives of the fight for freedom from Nazism. Indeed, post-war associations of politically persecuted Nazi victims even went so far as to reproach victims of racial persecution (i.e., Jews) for not
having actively taken up the fight against Fascism. All this was to change, however, in the 1960s: the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem was widely reported and discussed in European media, while the Auschwitz trials in Germany brought the question of individual and collective guilt—more than a decade after the end of the Nuremberg trials—to the public agenda once again. A further, even more decisive, trigger came in 1979 when the broadcast of Gerald Green’s American television “docudrama,” Holocaust, played a major role in bringing about a shift in attitudes toward the Nazi past of Germany (and to a lesser extent Austria). For the first time, the viewing audience was confronted with the emotional and personal dimensions of the Holocaust, played out in a soap opera, which enabled the average man to feel a degree of empathy for the victims.

III

It is no coincidence that post-war myths only began to disintegrate four decades after 1945. To be sure, the generation no longer immediately influenced by National Socialism was far better equipped and able to confront the question of individual and collective social involvement in Nazi crimes. The “war on memory” was fought in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Austria and in several other European countries as well. German federal president Richard von Weizsäcker’s historic speech delivered on May 8, 1985 in commemoration of the “Day of Liberation” forty years earlier and the Historikerstreit [historians’ clash] that rocked Germany in 1986 sparked discussions on dealing with German society’s Nazi past.

In Austria, former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim’s candidacy for the Austrian federal presidency triggered extensive and heated discussions at all political levels regarding his Nazi past, and in spite of the grave suspicion that he had indeed been involved in war crimes, he was elected to that office in 1986. Discussion continued, however, and ultimately led to a significant shift away from the ‘victim of Nazi Germany’ premise that had been cultivated in Austria for so long. In 1991, Austrian federal chancellor Franz Vranitzky made a strong declaration regarding Austrian co-responsibility for Nazi crimes. In France, the historian Henry Rousso’s 1987 analysis of the “Vichy Syndrome” unleashed a debate on the question of the Vichy government’s responsibility for the deportation of Jews.

Discussions of the unconquered, and at times even unexplored, recent past generally took place within national frameworks, and the value of any given national controversy was to be found in the critical analysis of its “own” historical identity. But the result of these national discussions was a transnational, European process of detachment from post-war myths and the formation of a new, common culture of European memory of the late twentieth century, which has as its signature the belated recognition of the victims of Nazi persecution. During this transformative
process, the “rupture in civilization” symbolized by the former Nazi-German death camp Auschwitz was identified as a place of common European memory.

Various expressions of this new culture of commemoration began to spring up across Europe: Holocaust memorials, memorial museums, places of memory and exhibitions at historic sites, and national Holocaust remembrance days were established, in the course of which the former extermination camp Auschwitz-Birkenau was recognized as a supranational memory site. In Germany, January 27, the day on which, in 1945, the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp was liberated, was proclaimed a Holocaust memorial day in 1995, and other countries have since followed this example. In 2002, the Council of Europe declared January 27 as European Day of Remembrance. Three years later the European Parliament agreed upon a “resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, antisemitism and racism,” published on January 27, 2005.

That year the ceremonies held in Auschwitz-Birkenau on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the camp’s liberation were attended by many heads of state and government. The live broadcast of the ceremony across many countries made it a European, if not a global, event. In November 2005, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution proclaiming January 27 as International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Further progress toward international institutionalization of Holocaust remembrance was made when the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust published its declaration in 1998: “The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning.” It was at this conference that the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) was founded, an organization encompassing currently twenty-six member states, among them many post-Communist and non-European countries.

Member states make a “clear public policy commitment to Holocaust education at a senior political level.” This will mean “appropriate involvement of relevant government departments” as well as the declaration of “A Holocaust Memorial Day (on January 27, or another date chosen by the applicant country).”

Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, the Holocaust was recognized as a “place of negative memory” (Etienne François) within a common European structure. Intellectual and academic discourse, as well as the practice of commemoration and its outward material representations and expressions—memorials, monuments, museums, commemoration days—already recognize the “rupture in civilization,”
symbolized by Auschwitz as that defining point of reference that combines both the gravest possible fissure in modern history and the radical “Other” of European and universal values. In that context, Yehuda Bauer, one of the initiators of the ITF, refers to the astonishing phenomenon that in the past two decades the Shoah has become “a symbol of evil in Western civilization, and that the awareness of this symbol seems to encompass the entire world.”

The project of the European Union was built “out of the crematoria of Auschwitz,” Judt writes, and “if Europe’s past is to continue to furnish Europe’s present with admonitory meaning and moral purpose—then it will have to be thought afresh with each passing generation.” Indeed, Holocaust memory has become the historical foundation of the ethical and moral values in Western civilization, the basis of a Europe committed to human rights, to the struggle against racism, antisemitism, xenophobia and discrimination.

However, the acknowledgement of the Shoah as the negative point of reference for European, if not global, history gained evidence not before the European “wars on memory”; only after the memory conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s did this attitude begin to prevail. As demonstrated above, post-war political culture was defined primarily in Austria, but in the beginning also in the Federal Republic of Germany, by the trivialization and relativization of the Holocaust. Recognition and awareness of Nazi extermination policy as an unprecedented “rupture in civilization” was in the post-war decades confronted by “opposing memories” (Dan Diner). President von Weizsäcker’s statement that May 8—any and all personal suffering aside—should be viewed today (i.e., in 1985) as the unequivocal victory over National Socialism was held despite the widespread, tacit understanding of that date as the day of surrender.

One year later, Ernst Nolte’s claims that the Bolsheviks’ class-based mass murder was the logical and factual prior condition for Nazi racial genocide and that the Gulag Archipelago was well in place before Auschwitz triggered a serious debate in German academia. In the course of that exchange, the so-called Historikerstreit, Jürgen Habermas and other well-known academics (many historians among them) rejected Nolte’s claim as an historically unacceptable trivialization of Nazi extermination policies.

Since the mid-1980s, debates regarding the position of National Socialism in German history were eventually extended to the very foundations of German society, in the course of which a completely new form of memory evolved—the “memory of guilt.” Volkhard Knigge, for many years director of the Buchenwald Memorial, calls it “negative remembrance”—“the public memory, not of crimes suffered, but of crimes committed.” Memory admonishes us, points to what “we”
have done to others, and—unlike traditional national commemorations—not to what others have done to “us.”

This is no longer a question of defiance and externalization of guilt or of the projection of guilt on to a political aggressor—the internal or external enemy—but rather a discussion of individual guilt and co-responsibility for the Holocaust, and for other acts of genocide and crimes against humanity committed in the name of a collective group.

This appropriation of the past primarily defines the present culture of remembrance of Western European countries. However, post-Communist European societies still seem to orientate official remembrance and the construction of historical identity by externalization of the dark sides of their past. In a corollary to Judt’s term of “post-war myths,” this process can be described as post-Communist political myth-building: “our own” society is viewed as the innocent victim of Communism, which is presented as a foreign domination foisted upon us by force, and any question of guilt is conveniently projected onto “the others.” Any involvement of “our own” people or society in the Communist rule is denied, as are crimes which do not fit into the framework of settling accounts with the overthrown Communist regime—such as the transfer of ethnic German populations after the end of World War II.

IV

In the recent past, significant efforts have been made to heighten the impact of post-Communist politics of history at the European political level. On April 2, 2009, the majority of delegates to the European Parliament voted in favor of a proposal put forward by delegates of the center-right European People’s Party to declare August 23 the “Day of European Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism.” The resolution on “European Conscience and Totalitarianism” was passed, with 553 votes in favor, 44 against, and 33 abstentions. In June 2008, an international conference in Prague devoted to “European Conscience and Communism” paved the way for this motion. The conference drafted and accepted the Prague Declaration, which calls for “recognition of Communism as an integral and horrific part of Europe’s common history.” The seventeen-point program put forward in this declaration proceeds from the assumption that the crimes of National Socialism and Communism are equivalent.

This declaration aims at

reaching an all-European understanding that both the Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes each needs to be judged by their own terrible merits to be
destructive in their policies of systematically applying extreme forms of terror, suppressing all civic and human liberties, starting aggressive wars and, as an inseparable part of their ideologies, exterminating and deporting whole nations and groups of population; and that as such they should be considered to be the main disasters which blighted the 20th century.

The Prague Declaration proposes the creation of an “Institute of European Memory and Conscience,” the founding of a “pan-European museum/memorial of victims of all totalitarian regimes,” and organization of a conference “on the crimes committed by totalitarian Communist regimes with the participation of representatives of governments, parliamentarians, academics, experts and NGOs.” It also calls for these crimes to be integrated into “European history textbooks so that children can learn and be warned about Communism and its crimes in the same way as they have been taught to assess the Nazi crimes.”

The proclamation of a European Day of Remembrance analogous to Holocaust Remembrance Day was aimed at reinforcing the idea that Communism and National Socialism were of equal significance. Point nine of the Declaration calls for the “establishment of August 23, the anniversary of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as a day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, in the same way Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust on January 27.”

To follow German culture specialist Albrecht Koschorkes’ concept of a political theory of narrative, recognition of “victim status”—as, for example, would be the case in a civil war—does not primarily depend on the experience itself, but rather on the manner in which the event is narrated. The same idea is valid where recognition of an historical victim status is concerned. An incorrect, or even false, narrative, the erroneous proclamation of a group’s identity as “victims,” can lead to isolation from the symbolic resources which a culture of memory can offer.

The Prague Declaration can be considered an attempt to legitimize the postulation of totalitarianism propagated by post-Communist politics of history through adoption of the narrative and cultural structures of (West) European Holocaust remembrance. The Stockholm Declaration, the founding text of the ITF, is very obviously the model on which it is based. But Nazi crimes are used only as vehicles for easily defined national, political and historical interests. Not a single paragraph of the Prague Declaration refers to any discourse on Nazi crimes; rather, the aim is to ascribe the same criminal character to Communist dictatorships as to the National Socialist regime.
In its statement accompanying the declaration for August 23 as a “Day of European Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism,” the European Parliament refers to the reasoning behind the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Totalitarianism: “Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a common view of its history, recognises Nazism, Stalinism and Fascist and Communist regimes as a ‘common legacy’ and brings about an ‘honest and thorough’ debate on all totalitarian crimes in the past century.”

The conservative Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita* hailed the initiative for the new European Day of Remembrance as adding to the debate on the role of “Moscow” in political history:

> In this case the aim is to underscore the true role of the Soviet Union, which was initially an ally of Nazi Germany, in the division of Europe and only changed to the other side in the ensuing battle over the spoils of war. The myth portraying the Soviet Union as victor over the Third Reich not only served Moscow well in its domestic policy. It was also used for many years to justify the Soviet Union and the Communist parties receiving special treatment in Western Europe. Honoring the victims of Stalinism along with Hitler’s victims will represent a fundamental condemnation of Stalinist Communism. For the majority of Europe’s Left—even today—this is an act that is barely acceptable.

This commentary refers to the political and ideological connotations and interests that are frequently linked to the remembrance of the victims of Communism. A glance at the contemporary discussion of political history in post-Communist societies (for example, the attempts at historical revision in Slovenia and Croatia) reveals that remembrance of the victims of Communism is usually accompanied by the delegitimization of the Communist resistance—as well as by the rehabilitation of those who collaborated with the Nazi authorities, or native Fascist regime. For the most part, whether through crimes of omission or commission, the rehabilitated took part in the destruction of local Jewish communities.

Equating Communism with National Socialism under the umbrella term of “totalitarianism” is incompatible with the modern European culture of remembrance, a lesson that the then Lithuanian foreign minister, Sandra Kalniete, learned after her opening speech at the Leipzig Book Fair in 2004. On that occasion a storm of protest was unleashed when the minister stated that “both totalitarian regimes—National Socialism and Communism—were equally criminal.” Indeed, the culture of “negative remembrance” in Germany evolved from efforts to overcome this very attitude.
Totalitarianism theory defined West European political history throughout the Cold War: its purpose was to assist in the historical battle against Communism by equating it with National Socialism. After 1968, with changes in intellectual and academic thinking, a counter-concept evolved in the form of Fascism theory: Fascism was now located in the continuity of capitalistic-bourgeois forms of society. The instrument of historical comparison served various political agendas: it functioned not only as a weapon against political and ideological opponents at home and abroad, but also as means to tearing out the darkest pages of the past.

The two days of commemoration, January 27 for the Holocaust and August 23 for the victims of Communism, derive from very different points of historical reference. They are indicative of the divergent interpretations of what the function of memory is able to achieve in a given society. European Holocaust commemoration is characterized, as discussed above, by a negative remembrance, one which ponders a given society’s culpability in past acts and the moral and ethical consequences for the present. The commemoration for the victims of Communism, in contrast, apparently has the same function as that which underlies the European post-war myths: presenting the given society as a victim of foreign powers, and “externalizing” any participation in the regime and its crimes.

Commenting on the European Parliament’s resolution determining August 23—the date on which in 1939 the “infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement” was signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—as a date of remembrance to victims of both regimes, Bauer recently expressed his “deep concern.” He chastised repeated attempts to equate the Nazi regime’s genocidal policies, with the Holocaust at their center, with other murderous or oppressive actions.” He noted that this is “an equation that not only trivializes and relativizes the genocide of the Jews perpetrated by the Nazi regime, but is also a mendacious revision of recent world history.” There can be “no doubt as to the crimes of violent and often murderous oppression of the Soviet regime in the countries of Eastern Europe,” but this cannot be equated with the genocidal annihilation of the European Jews, planned and executed by Nazi Germany and its collaborators. Stalinism and Nazism “were both totalitarian, and yet quite different. The greater threat to all of humanity was Nazi Germany, and it was the Soviet Army that liberated Eastern Europe, was the central force that defeated Nazi Germany, and thus saved Europe and the world from the Nazi nightmare.” Obviously it is necessary to recall that “World War II was started by Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, and the responsibility of the 35 million dead in Europe, 29 million of them non-Jews, is that of Nazi Germany, not Stalin.”

Bauer concludes that it is not the commemoration of the victims of Communism itself that is incompatible with the memory of the Holocaust: “One certainly
should remember the victims of the Soviet regime, and there is every justification for designating special memorials and events to do so. But to put the two regimes on the same level and commemorating the different crimes on the same occasion is totally unacceptable.\(^{59}\)

Rather, it is the obvious attempt to use Holocaust commemoration for other (vested) interests, and to extend the hierarchy of commemoration, which defines the politics of memory in many post-Communist countries, across the entire European Union. The choice of August 23 is a clear indicator of these intentions. Certainly, there are many other suitable historical dates—that of the October Revolution, for example—with which to commemorate the victims of Communism without equating them with the victims of National Socialism. Ukraine’s persistent efforts for recognition of the 1932–1933 *Holodomor* (Great Famine) as genocide is an example of this as well.\(^{40}\)

VI

Now that there are two competing European days of commemoration, the question regarding the success or failure of the project of a common European memory may be asked. After the collapse of the post-war myths, the West European culture of memory was orientated toward the leitmotif of “negative memory.” Value systems of societies become visible through the acknowledgment of “our own guilt” in the past. Commemoration of the Holocaust draws a symbolic border: violations of human and citizens’ rights, racism, antisemitism, and discrimination of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities are contradictory to the moral and ethical values of society.

Memory cannot simply be put to rest, for it is the result of an ongoing process of “doing memory”—in public debate, in the media, in relevant political decisions, in the ways and manners in which memory is cultivated. The “Battle for Memory,” and with it the discussion and definition of the value systems of a given society must constantly be waged anew. With its declaration for August 23 as “Day of European Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism,” the parliament of the European Union has opened a new theater for the politics of commemoration, one that adds an additional European framework to national negotiations and conflicts acknowledging or neglecting the “memory of guilt” of a given society.

The question at hand does not solely concern the definition of national commemoration, for now memory has also become a common European matter. Is the creation of a sustainable basis of common European memory best served by the reactivation of totalitarianism theory and the equating of the crimes of National Socialism with those of Communism? Or is this a phenomenon that will
only help legitimize the historical claims of those groups and parties that are not at all interested in commemorating the victims of the Nazi regime, and are even dismissive of their sufferings? Only time will tell.

Translated from the German by Sandra Forrester

Notes


2 “TerrorHaza” visitors guide (Budapest, 2002).


4 Ibid.


9 See Monika Flacke (ed.), Mythen der Nationen 1945—Arena der Erinnerungen (Mainz, 2004); Manfred Sapper and Volker Weichsel (eds.), Geschichtspolitik und Gegenerinnerung Krieg, Gewalt und Trauma im Osten Europas (Berlin, 2008).

10 For example, the rally of the former Nazi concentration camp inmates in Austria on the 10th anniversary of the liberation, under the theme, “To be human is to be anti-Fascist.” According to an article entitled “The New Admonition,” in the journal of the camp inmates’ association affiliated with the Communist party, “The vast majority of victims were not active political opponents of Fascism. How many of the millions who were murdered in the gas chambers at Auschwitz, in the last agonizing minutes of their lives (...) probably regretted their tragic mistake?” See Brigitte Baier, Bertrand Perz, Heidemarie Uhl, Neugestaltung der Österreichischen Gedenkstätte im Staatlichen Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau. Projektenbericht (Vienna 2008), pp. 36f. www.doew.at/information/endbericht_gedenkstaette_auschwitz.pdf.


15 Dan Diner (ed.), Zivilisationssbruch: Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt am Main, 1988).

16 See www.tandis.odihr.pl/index.php?p=ki-hr.instru

17 www.holocausttaskforce.org/about/index.php?content=stockholm/.

18 Ibid.; for the ITF see Jens Kroh, Transnationale Erinnerung. Der Holocaust im Fokus geschichtspolitischer Initiativen (Frankfurt am Main, 2008).


20 See, for example, Dan Diner, Gegenläufige Gedächtnisse: Über Geltung und Wirkung des Holocaust (Göttingen, 2007); Aleida Assmann, “Europe: A Community of Memory?” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, XL (2007), 11–25.

21 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (Frankfurt am Main, 2001).


24 See Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, 2004).


31 Pressemitteilung. 23. August zum Gedenktag für Opfer totalitärer und autoritärer Regime machen,” op. cit.


36 See Anson Rabinbach, Begriffe aus dem Kalte Krieg. Totalitarismus, Antifaschismus, Genozid (Göttingen, 2009.)


38 Ibid.